As far as the Hudson Institute is concerned, the publication in 1974 of its doom-laden: “The United Kingdom in 1980” and three major illusions about North Sea oil was another masterpiece of timing which overlooked the rise to power of Margaret Thatcher. This issue and related ones have been discussed elsewhere. This was a scenario which other members of the scenario group regarded at the time (and since) as ludicrously over-optimistic – and, of course, most unfortunately timed in the case of the book’s publication. It was the Hudson Institute which peddled the notion of a Belle Epaque or La Deuxieme Belle Epoque scenario, which even featured in the later Hudson Institute book: “World Economic Development: 1979 and Beyond”. There were one or two influential voices in the scenario team who had been close to Herman Kahn and the Hudson Institute for some years. Since an alternative “New Belle Epoque” scenario has been mentioned, it may be worth brief comment. The scenario book also noted that solar energy represented a further vast energy resource, “of which the surface has been barely scratched.” For Shell the decision to enter the nuclear sector was marred by choice of partner, if nothing else. There was an expectation by some that these forces would support the rapid development of nuclear – a view which some countries took successfully on board (such as France), while others (such as Denmark) opted to go for coal to enhance supply security. Other features of this scenario included the holding back of economic growth rates and per capita incomes in countries other than those which were resource rich and able to trade “vibrantly” a lack of incentives or rewards was likely to hold back productivity increases and balance of payments were likely to become more problematic for countries heavily dependent upon imports. “Within most Societies expectations outstrip the achievement potential as the ‘takers and dreamers have a more influential role.” “In the energy sector the supply problem is perceived as imposing a constraint on growth.” “It is thought another major regional conflict in the Middle East, further serious threats to energy supplies, or another major currency crisis and recession could well precipitate the world into this path rather than that of the alternative scenario we have called a New Belle Epoque”. Although members of the scenario group had different views on the emphasis to be placed on key features, the outstanding ones were: On pages 20–21 of that 100-page book key elements of a “World of Internal Contradictions” scenario were set out. Shell had won high regard for its assessment of a likely first ‘oil crisis’ (although the timing was a little out), and so in October 1974, “Scenarios for the 1975 Planning Cycle” was issued internally. But the complexities, uncertainties and time horizons involved suggest modelling is a marginal option compared with other approaches.
The future, like the past, seems likely to be riddled with internal contradictions and failure to find satisfactory resolution of important challenges for the human race. Some fundamentals of the exploitation and use of energy resources were as apparent then as they are now. There were numerous internal contradictions anticipated in the evolution of this long-term scenario that have been apparent over the past forty years and seem likely to continue. Changes in social attitudes were thought likely to shift the emphasis from working for high achievement to ‘takers and dreamers’ having a more influential role. The paper opens with a summary of the October 1974, risks then anticipated: another regional conflict in the Middle East further serious threats to energy supplies and another currency crisis and recession. Some other elements have since intruded, though they should not have been entirely unsuspected. Key elements of Shell’s “World of Internal Contradictions” scenario, issued internally in October 1974, still hold good. For over forty years energy expectations have been riddled with internal contradictions, and all too often a failure to recognise complexity, the nature and scale of the challenges to be faced, and resultant uncertainty.